It is a great pleasure for me to visit Hamburg, and I am particularly happy to do so under the auspices of the Overseas Club. Your invitation is a great honour, and the welcome I have received here has moved me greatly.

I suppose that this city is one of the best known throughout the entire world. Certainly, in my own country every schoolboy has heard in his studies of the free and Hanseatic city of Hamburg. In the world of today you are respected as one of the great commercial and industrial centres, and as an important gateway to and from Europe. When we, as outsiders, think of this city, perhaps two of your characteristics are foremost in our minds: the great spirit of enterprise which has made you so important in a material sense and which in a short time raised you literally from the ashes of World War II; perhaps more important, however, is the love of freedom which has marked you throughout your long history and which today provides such a strong bond with other cities, other states and other countries.

It is this common bond of interest, to which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization provides the strongest ties, that I wish to discuss with you tonight.

When the last war ended, you citizens of Hamburg promptly and with great effectiveness undertook to repair the physical damage of battle. At the same time, I know that you shared the almost universal hope that we and our children could look forward to a world free from the threat of war—a world of normal, friendly relationship between men and between countries. But little more than a year later, it was clearly established that we would be faced with political aggression and military threat. The seizure of power by the Communists in Czechoslovakia, against the will of the majority of the people of that country, occurred in 1948. The same year, the brave people of West Berlin were besieged by a blockade. At almost the same time conditions were being created which would shortly lead to the unprovoked attack against South Korea, which was eventually to be thrown back by the forces of free countries under United Nations command.

There was at that time every reason, in prudence and selfpreservation, why twelve free nations of the West, who saw a common danger and felt a common sense of responsibility, should look urgently to their physical defense. This led to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which was formally established by the signing of the Treaty in Washington in April of 1949 and which was enlarged by the additional of Greece and Turkey in 1952 and the Federal Republic in 1955. At my headquarters, we have just marked the Tenth Anniversary of the organization of Allied Command Europe and the supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe—SHAPE—which were established to develop and to unify our defense means.

The fact that there have been many and varied reactions in NATO suggests that it has many facets; that what each of us sees in it may be influenced to some extent by the particular position from which he looks. To some, NATO means armed forces—army, navy and air forces—deployed on or near the Iron Curtain for the purpose of defending the people and territory of the Atlantic Community. This is certainly correct so far as it goes, but it is perhaps incomplete. Some others seem to think only in these terms. To think only in these terms presents a dangerously distorted picture. Still others think of the Alliance in political and economic terms, and quite correctly. I think that balance was introduced into the composite idea of the spirit of the Alliance by a London newspaper which said a year or two ago that «NATO has itself come to be synonymous with other combinations of letters which also stir deep emotions in the hearts of men—freedom, peace, independence, human comradeship and the will to survive.»
I myself think of NATO first as a purpose and as a set of principles to which we have dedicated our efforts, and then as responsibilities which relate to or derive from these principles—responsibilities which we are formally committed to meet.

In the simplest and most direct form, the aims to the Alliance are stated in the preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty. On this occasion, so near the Tenth Anniversary of Allied Command Europe, I think it is proper to consider the actual language of that document:

"The Parties of this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security."

This is not the occasion to trace development of our concept and strategy and I am sure that you understand that I cannot give you details of the strength, the very real power, which has been created since 1951 and which is being maintained and enhanced. We should note, however, that the increased effectiveness of weapons has permitted us to think in terms of a true forward strategy—and by forward strategy I mean defense on the eastern boundary of the NATO countries—a point of particular interest to the city of Hamburg. Although this posture has not been achieved in all respects everywhere throughout NATO Europe, it is the objective to be achieved as our growing strength makes it possible. This ability to think in a forward sense has given an expanded function, a great opportunity, to the armies, navies and air forces deployed in Europe.

The word «deterrent» has great currency in our time; although it is not always used in the same sense. Within the NATO meaning, the deterrent is made up of several essential elements. One is, of course, the retaliatory forces—the great strategic forces with which we are all generally familiar, and which for this reason I shall not discuss at any length now. I wish only to remind you that defense as well as deterrence requires that our military posture be built upon a foundation of adequate strategic retaliatory forces, in being and effective.

The other element of the deterrent—the one which I desire to talk to you about tonight—is also vital to both deterrence and defense. This is the Allied Shield Force, made up of the soldiers, sailors and airmen of the fourteen nations who serve in Allied Command Europe and who man the long forward line of NATO from the northern cape of Norway to eastern Turkey, a distance of more than 4,000 miles. As military forces deployed along the NATO frontiers they contribute directly to the prevention of war by their presence and by their power. Added to the moral strength of which they are a symbol, they give us confidence that freedom can be preserved; they give a sound basis for the hope that war may be prevented.

Among the missions of this command is the classic one of defending—protecting the people and territory of the NATO countries. The presence of Allied forces in the forward areas—perhaps particularly the presence of the overseas elements of these forces, the British, the Canadian and the American—supply silent but constantly visible evidence of Allied determination and Allied strength. Just by being there for peaceful men and women to see as they pursue their normal life, they nourish the spirit of the Alliance; they give reality to the hope for peace; they certify to the watch being kept over their lands, their villages, their cities. This is a fact which I know means such to you people of Hamburg.

The important, perhaps the most important, task of Allied Command Europe is to contribute to the prevention of war—to complete the deterrent of which I have just spoken. To do this we must be prepared to meet with appro-
appropriate means the demands of any incident, intentional or unintentional, from
the smallest consequence of an aggressor’s miscalculation to conditions
approaching those of all-out war. For this reason we feel that any valid stra-

t egy for Europe must have three objectives: first should an incident start,
whether it is the result of a deliberate probing effort, or an unorganized and
misdirected flare-up as the result of an accidental border incident, we must
have here in Europe the means to force a pause, to compel a break in the con-
tinuity of the action that has started; second during this pause our posture,
political and military, must be such that we can compel the aggressor to make
a deliberate choice between ending the action or permitting it to grow; third
while he is making this decision we must always confront the aggressor with
the total cost of his action. He must be forced to realize that expanding the
incident will not only place on him the moral responsibility for starting a
general war, but it will promptly bring to bear the full strength of an alert and
ready Shield and, if necessary, the full weight of the retaliatory forces. To this
task the Shield Forces, with their ability to meet a threat with the strength in
men and weapons appropriate to the situation, to provide a response adequa-
te to the challenge, make a unique contribution; they can create the neces-
sary pause, gain some time for thought, and, we would hope, prevent force from
overcoming reason.

Another purpose of the Shield is to give real validity to the great strategic
retaliatory forces. Were our strength inadequate, our equipment unsatisfacto-
ry, or our deployment improper, we would be permitted no choice of respon-
se between all-out, full-scale retaliation or no action at all. In such a case,
doubt would certainly be cast on the deterrent value of all forces, particular-
ly on the heavy strategic forces. Thus, the purpose of the Shield is to bridge
the gap between all or nothing; to provide a means of defense appropriate to
the measure of the threat; to give validity to the principle of deterrence and
credibility to the role of the heavy strike forces.

It is NATO policy, and a sound policy in my judgment, that we must not
unse more strength than is necessary. But it is also NATO policy, and also
sound, that we must be prepared to meet an attack with a counter effort that is
clearly adequate. The force needed for this, as defined by our plans and pro-
grammes, is made up of army, navy and air force units of suitable size and
types, with a balance of conventional and nuclear weapons. The substantial
dependence which we must place on nuclear weapons is reflected in our
plans; nevertheless, as conventional capabilities improve or increase, it
should clearly be possible, under certain conditions, to raise the level of invol-
vement at which such weapons would havbe to be introduced into the battle.
Certainly, where the military situation permits, our forces must be sufficient-
ly flexible to operate without resorting to arms or weapons equipped with
nuclear warheads. On the other hand, they must be prepared to do so where-
ver such action is clearly necessary for our defense. The performance of these
tasks will require Shield Forces of at least the general magnitude projected by
our present programmes. i have never made a secret of the fact that I wish we
could have even more.

It is my own opinion that the basic combat elements should be so organi-
ized, trained and equipped that in the event of an incident they would normal-
ly respond with conventional weapons. If, however, nuclear weapons must be
introduced into the battle, the threshold of action at which this step would be
taken should be a high one and the use of these weapons should result only
from a specific and deliberate decision made at a level decided by proper
authorities.

I believe that we must, throughout our planning and our training, give even
greater emphasis to the need for conventional forces, for adequate manpower,
for the so-called conventional weapons of the most modern type, and for
increased tactical mobility; but we must also have suitable atomic units asso-
ciated with our conventional forces, units which could be used if the situation
requires. This would form a balanced team to halt the aggression, to force the
pause.

The idea of the balanced team is illustrated by the mobile force which
SHAPE is now organizing. This has been called «the fire brigade». This mobile force was actually activated several months ago and we are now pressing vigorously to give it real life and substance. It has committed to it at this moment an initial nucleus of four reinforced battalions and four air squadrons. The mobile force may be considered a sort of strategic reserve, since its purpose is to provide a prompt reinforcement to any point within NATO where it could be effective in countering a threat which may have developed. A well-known general of the American Civil War – a great character – summarized his first principle of strategy as getting there «firstest with the mostest». This general principle is, of course, even more applicable in defense today than it was 100 years ago. Although in the mobile force the «mostest» may be relatively small in numbers, in terms of timely application, in terms of potential fire power, it could be more than the most which has ever been employed in this manner up to this time.

Such a force – the mobile force – could also serve an important political function. NATO political authorities could, for example, direct its use to demonstrate NATO solidarity and unity of purpose in a threatened area, to make it clear to an aggressor that an attack against one is in fact an attack against all, not only in the abstract words of the North Atlantic Treaty, but also in solid reality.

I am sure that all of us must accept the fact that when one speaks of defense in the context of our times, the subject of nuclear weapons must play an important part. For this reason, the nature of the NATO atomic capability, its use and control, are subjects of the most serious study in NATO headquarters, political as well as military, and in many – perhaps most – of the capitals of the Alliance. I, as a military man, would under no circumstances wish to endorse a specific solution to what is overwhelmingly a political problem. Since our political authorities are now preoccupied with this subject, for me to advocate a particular solution would be as unnessecary as it would be inappropriate. However, on the basis of my interests, my responsibility as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, it seems incumbent upon me to assist in defining the problem, at least so far as it pertains to my command. in doing this I wish to emphasize the fact that I speak as an Allied Commander. Nothing that I say should be construed as even suggesting the views or the positions of any government, of any individual, or of any agency other than myself and my headquarters.

The Heads of all the NATO countries gathered in a historic meeting in Paris in the fall of 1957. At that time they took certain important decision relating to new weapons. The statement of the Heads of Government at the conclusion of that meeting may help to put the subject into proper perspective: «The Soviet leaders, while preventing a general disarmament agreement, have made a clear that the most modern and destructive weapons, including missiles of all kinds, are being introduced in the Soviet armed forces. In the Soviet view, all European nations except the USSR should, without waiting for general disarmament, renounce nuclear weapons and missiles and rely on arms of the pre-atomic age. As long as the Soviet Union persists in this attitude, we have no alternative but to remain vigilant and to look to our defenses. We are therefore resolved to achieve the most effective pattern of NATO military defensive strength, taking into account the most recent developments in weapons and techniques.

To this end, NATO has decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defence of the Alliance in case of need. In view of the present Soviet policies in the field of new weapons, the council has also decided that intermediate range ballistic missiles will have to be put at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe.»

Very important progress in this field has been made since these decisions were reached. I wish to emphasize the fact that we have even now a very substantial nuclear-delivery capability, and this capability is distributed to almost every major Allied command. Some of the delivery vehicles have a dual pur-
pose; that is, they can deliver conventional as well as nuclear explosives. They are of many types, ranging from those designed for very short-range air defense and battlefield use to the mid-range ballistic missiles and the fighter and medium bomber aircraft. Let me emphasize again that equipment of this type is now deployed within Allied Command Europe.

In this discussion we should clearly distinguish between delivery means which, as I have stated, are distributed throughout the command, and warheads—that is, the actual nuclear components—which are handled quite separately. Under the NATO atomic stockpile system, the actual nuclear components would be supplied to combat units only when the situation clearly demands and only after a specific decision has been made to do so. Until that decision is made, the nuclear components themselves are retained in the strictest custody of the country from which they came. I wish to emphasize that the needs of Nato do not serve to enlarge or to expand the number of independent authorities having control of atomic warheads. There is no proliferation of independent nuclear capabilities; there is no extension of custody or control of nuclear devices.

In the course of the last year there has been increasing speculation on the future position of atomic weapons in the Alliance, their types and how they should be controlled. Here is where I feel that I may be of particular help by defining the problem rather than by proposing a solution.

There appear to be several related, but separate and distinct, areas for consideration. Of these, the question of control is of the greatest overall importance, since it applies to what we have now as well as to what we will have in the future, regardless of the size or the particular nature of the stockpile or delivery capability.

The forces which are assigned to the NATO mission require the support of nuclear weapons. The defense of Europe against a serious, largescale attack certainly depends on these weapons, as I have stated earlier this evening. This has given rise to two important questions: how can the Alliance as a whole be assured that such weapons will be available to it in all reasonable circumstances for the defense of Europe; and how do we meet the apparent desire for a broader sharing in the control of these particular weapons? The search for a fair solution to this problem of sharing of control is certainly of the most vital concern to all of us. I am pleased that this subject is being considered by the political authorities of the Alliance.

There is another subject now being discussed which bears very directly on my command. This is our need for mid-range ballistic missiles, which was recognized at the Heads of Government meeting in 1957. These are weapons whose range would permit them to operate where the battlefield types leave off, that is, from the 200 to 300 mile range, up to the 1,000 to 1,500 mile distance which is necessary to give us depth and flexibility and to permit the target coverage essential to the direct and immediate defense of Europe. This requirement does not go beyond the scope of the tasks presently assigned to my command; it springs directly from the functions and the responsibilities which we now have and which we have had for several years.

It is unlikely that even by 1970 the missile will entirely supplant manned aircraft in NATO Europe, perhaps particularly because of the continuing need for a conventional capability. However, it is clear that some of the roles which now could be performed by the fighter and bomber aircraft would in the future have to be taken over by the missiles if our mission is to be accomplished. In fact, if in the 1965−70 period we are to have in this important field the same relative strength that we actually have had for the last several years, there appears to be no alternative. As we see it, this is a modernization programme. Such a programme does not create a NATO strategic force; in fact, in itself it is not even a step in that direction. It does not involve new functions, new tasks, or even, in principle, new weapons.

It simply calls for a modern delivery system. I have made my views on these military requirements known to our governments, as well as to the appropriate NATO authorities. I am confident they are giving full consideration to this subject. I have discussed in tonight for the sole purpose of clarification,
of definition. I am not here endorsing or proposing any particular solution to
the problem.
At this anniversary period, as we look back over the last ten years, I think
we can all be thankful that our countries joined together and seized the oppor-
tunity to protect our people from possible subjugation, humiliation and des-
pair. As a result, we can – all of us – hold our heads high and point with pride
to a full decade of peace and security – and I would certainly add prosperity –
in our North Atlantic Treaty area.
This happy result has not been accomplished without effort and sacrifice.
Nothing worthwhile, I believe, is accomplished without sacrifice; and no
doubt or joint sacrifice for freedom will have to continue for many years to
come. Nor was it accomplished without developing a concept of defense
which in many respects is new and bold, a concept designed to match the
speed and power of modern warfare – a concept of collective defense. I pro-
foundly believe this concept is both sound and necessary. By its very nature it
threatens no one and because it is unified it multiplies our power. It has main-
tained peace in the NATO area.
Behind the Shield of our defenses our countries have not only lived secure
from invasion; they have prospered and they have learned to work together.
Through the exercise of their free institutions they have developed the resour-
ces and the means to project their set of values – their way of life – beyond the
area guaranteed by the North Atlantic Treaty. I think we have reached a point
where we can grasp new opportunities and accept new challenges in our Alli-
ance. Since our opportunities are greater and our joint resources are more ade-
quate to the task, I believe we can think in broader terms and act in broader
ways than we have done over the past ten years.
This reaching out to new horizons can only be done on the basis of the posi-
tion of strength and confidence that has been achieved. I need to say to you
that I am an advocat of continued NATO military strength, fully adequate to
defend against, and hence in deterring any attack which may be launched
against us. This collective defensive strength must be maintained. It must
keep pace with the requirements imposed by the threat against us. It must be
maintained until an agreed system of controlled and thoroughly safeguarded
disarmament, unhappily not yet achieved but sincerely sought by all of our
countries, is established.
A great American, one-time Secretary of State and one-time Secretary of
War, Henry L. Stimpson, said:
«I have lived with the reality of war, and I have praised soldiers; but the
hope of honorable faithful peace is a greater thing and I have lived with that
too. That a man must live with both together is inherent in the nature of our
present stormy stage of human progress, but it has also many times been the
nature of progress in the past and it is not reason for despair.»

May I say that this great man was right – we do not know despair. We have
created strength, moral as well as material. We have gained confidence in our-
selves and respect from our opponents. May we worthy of this heritage of
faith and hope we now enjoy.